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Bob Eaglestone recently pointed out  in  his  keynote at  the Twenty-First-Century British Fiction
conference, among many controversial statements on “value”, that we need to read and comment
upon more contemporary fiction in translation. It is with this in mind, following Liz's excellent
theoretical exposition, that I wish to turn to Roberto Bolaño's 2666.
[SLIDE]
 2666 has been heralded as phenomenal. Impossible to do justice to its size and scope, by
way  of  synopsis,  Bolaño's  novel  interweaves  five  narratives  concerning  a  set  of  self-obsessed
literary critics, Oscar Amalfitano, Oscar Fate, Bolaño's fictional reclusive author Archimbaldi and a
central section on “the crimes” across a 900 page epic. These “crimes” form the dystopian, or form
of utopian, centrepiece with which the novel batters its reader: the sequential, gruelling description
of the bodies of the female sexual homicides around the fictional town of Santa Teresa, a thinly
veiled rendition of the ongoing, horrendous reality in Ciudad Juárez [See-you-dad hwAR-eth]. In
fact, in response to such violence, the novel explicitly queries utopian premises when it asks “why
Thomas More [...]?” (193) and posits itself as a “great, imperfect, torrential [work]” that struggles
“against something, that something that terrifies us all, that something that […] spurs us on, amid
blood and mortal wounds and stench” (227). The aspects of this work that I want to think about
today, however, on our theme of the pedagogy and teaching of twenty-first-century texts, are the
extent to which Bolaño's novel could fall under the remit of a category I term “crypto-didacticism”
and the extent to which teaching post-millenial fiction could be read in its adjectival form as post-
millenial fiction that teaches. Furthermore, I want to think about fictions of process, by which I
mean a strand of metafiction that asks us to value the journey, rather than the arrival, the reading,
rather than the having-read.  I  want  to relate this  to Adorno's  twentieth-century formulations on
autonomy and commitment, asking whether a mode of new didacticism is entering the twenty-first-
century novel. Re-thinking Adornion paralysis in this context, I will then move to examine teaching
practice as it pertains to large novels and politically engaged literature, alongside the ways in which
we read the sociological history of the academy itself,  following the literary critics in Bolaño's
novel, arguing for a fusion of historicist and critical approaches that remains, nonetheless, anti-
utilitarian. As Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron put it, in senses that I want to read in both
sociological terms for the university and in literary terms for didactic fiction:
[SLIDE]
“[s]urely we need to question the underlying social and political functions of a teaching relationship
which  so  often  fails,  yet  has  not  provoked a  revolt,  and which  is  so  often  attacked,  but  only
ritualistically or ideologically” (3).
[SLIDE]
So,  what  do  I  mean  by  “crypto-didacticism”?  Bolaño's  novel  explicitly  encourages
comparisons to Thomas Pynchon, as one of its central figures is a much-lauded reclusive novelist
and the trajectory  of  this  didacticism can be traced back to  works  such as  Gravity's  Rainbow.
Although it has taken critics a long time to realise it, the ethical core of Pynchon's work can be
easily  summarised:  contemporary  America's  power  is  predicated  upon  instruments  of  death,
developed by the Nazis, built by slave labour and exemplified by the V-2 rocket. Of course, there is
much else of interest in Pynchon's and Bolaño's respective fictions and aesthetics, but I think a
similar ethical formula can be deduced from 2666: four hundred women have been tortured, raped
and murdered, the police do nothing about it because the victims are working class women and, to
quote Bolaño directly, “nobody noticed” (372). In other words, amid rampant “gynophobia” (382)
and rampant misogyny (552): “the women here aren't worth shit” (318).
[SLIDE]
Now, Grant  Farred has argued, somewhat  differently, that  Bolaño's  true focus is  upon a
critique of postcolonialism's entanglement with neoliberalism, a critique that I  find lacking, but
nonetheless further strengthens the point that I'm attempting to make here.  To put it  concisely:
ethical readings of complex, lengthy fictions tend towards a specific didactic hermeneutic in which
the novel is seen as a disciplinary text that attempts to interpellate subjects within its own moral
framework. It could be for these novels, as  2666's Florita Almada puts it that “teaching children
might  be the best job in  the world,  gently opening children's  eyes,  even the tiniest  bit”  (456).
Bolaño  does  so  through  the  process  of  interpretation,  though;  to  leap  straightforwardly  to  the
endpoint is to miss the subject-forming aspect of these texts, which means that the novelistic form
here is pedagogical in Bourdieu's terms of efficiency (5). Hence, the didacticism is encoded in such
a way that the reader must invest intellectual energy, or capital, in the text in order to purchase the
ethical payoff. This, of course, presents a pedagogical problem for teaching such work at Higher
Education  level:  the  course  of  a  seminar  cannot  be  pre-dictated  and  it  is  likely  that  a  lecture
component, often coming before the seminar, will already touch upon the pre-formulated end result,
thus degrading the utopic power of such fiction. This is, though, the same problem that explication
creates in any form, be that research or teaching, for as Louis Marin puts it in his study of Utopics,
in a formulation with which I'm sure we're all familiar: “The benefits of pleasure the textual word
play triggered were capitalized into analyses and theses. An authoritative power settled at the very
spot of what is not capable of interpretation […] It may simply be impossible to write and speak
about utopia” (xx).
Although we often like to think, then, that new fictions require new ways of reading, I'm not
so convinced that this is straightforwardly true, especially across such constructed bounds as “post-
millenial literature”; after all, this is based on a Christian calendar. [SLIDE] What I think is clear is
that we can identify certain emergent trends of practice, some of which seem totally new and could
require new modes of reading, while others have a clear trajectory from well before the century's
break. With this in mind, sparing you from the more fashionable approaches through Hardt, Negri
or  Agamben,  I'd  like  to  turn  to  Theodor  Adorno's  formulation  on  ideas  of  autonomous  and
committed art, before coming back to Marin. I'm going to consider Bolaño's last novel within two
opposed critical frameworks: as political and as utopian. These frameworks are opposed because, in
the instance of political success, the critical utopian function of the artwork is destroyed: as Marin
puts it, this is when utopic practice comes “to the awareness of its own process” as “revolutionary
praxis” (279).
[SLIDE]
Adorno's essay “Commitment” presents a specific response to Sartre's notion of committed
literature that is relevant to the discussion at hand. Although Adorno is also highly critical of the
term “commitment” for its coercive mode of non-freedom in existentialist philosophy – a point he
outlines in The Jargon of Authenticity (34, 69-70) – in the essay piece “Commitment” Adorno posits
two polarities of literature: [SLIDE] committed art that has a specific political aim, but “strips the
magic from a work of art that is content to be a fetish” (175) and autonomous art, or “art for art's
sake”  which  falsely  denounces  its  own  “ineradicable  connection  with  reality”  (176).  These
positions, in which each dialectically “negates itself with the other” (176) constitute the space in
which all art, Adorno claims, has lived. Interestingly for the discussion at hand, Adorno stresses that
Brecht's original intention, in which Adorno believes he failed, was to practice an art that [SLIDE]
“both  presents  itself  as  didactic,  and  claims  aesthetic  dispensation  from responsibility  for  the
accuracy of what it teaches” (183). The first problem for Brecht as Adorno sees it is that “the more
preoccupied [he] becomes with information, and the less he looks for images, the more he misses
the essence of capitalism which the parable is supposed to present” (183). The second is that, in
Brecht's downgraded metaphors, in this case the substitution of a “trivial gangster organization” for
“a conspiracy of the wealthy and powerful” in The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, “the true horror of
fascism is conjured away” (184). As Adorno puts it in “Commitment”,  [SLIDE] “For the sake of
political commitment, political reality is trivialized” (184-185) and in  The Jargon of Authenticity,
“'Commitment' is the current word for the unreasonable demand of discipline” (69).
2666 is, in many ways, a work of epic theatre, for it seeks to “make men think”, as Adorno
puts it, but it does not rely upon a Brechtian verfremdungseffekt. Instead, it cloaks any metafictional
estrangement in the mechanism of its action. It is an overloading, not distancing, effect.  [SLIDE]
Furthermore, I think that Bolaño's novel goes a long way towards a negation of Adorno's warning of
committed literature's  affiliation  to  pornography. This  is  not  the  more recent  idea of  “empathy
fatigue” espoused in the wake of mass media culture, bur rather that, for Adorno, “[t]he so-called
artistic representation of the sheer physical pain of people […] contains, however remotely, the
power to elicit enjoyment” (189). While Carolyn J. Dean points out, in her critique of this argument,
that this strain of thought has a heritage as far back as Diderot in the eighteenth century (89), but
substantially increased in usage around the 1960s in reference to the Holocaust, Bolaño recognises
this conflation of sexuality and power that can occur in artistic representation and so constantly
reminds the reader  that  this  pornographic mode is  also one of  sexual  violence;  every time the
potential to forget the affinity between the modes surfaces, the text reminds us that many if not all
of the victims piled up in 2666 have been both vaginally and anally raped. To rephrase this: Bolaño
appreciates the fine line between empathy and pornography and metafictionally signposts this so
that, each time the trap is open, the reader is pointed around the pitfall. Bolaño, like Dean, wants to
express “something quite a bit more complicated than the conventional notion that pornography
represents an unspeakable association between sexuality and murder ” (106), but is aware of this
link and warns the reader of their potential complicity.
[SLIDE]
This questioning of societal independence in art, in conjunction with the idea of the utopian
in 2666, prompts a return to Louis Marin and his reading of May '68. Bolaño clearly signals that the
function of the university, or rather its breakdown, is crucial to his investigation through the satirical
portrayal of the literature professors and pretentious writing (661), although it is worth noting the
greater menipppean nature of this satire in opposition to, say, “An Orison of Sonmi~451” in David
Mitchell's  Cloud Atlas  which swipes at the Golden Arches of the capitalist diner. Taking a more
serious look at the university in relation to revolution and resistance, though, Marin asks: “Wasn't
this the place where the relationship between teacher and student, authorized and institutionalized,
could be deconstructed through this relationship's very content?” The University was proposed, at
this time of optimism, as a “'properly' utopic space” (4). But, how much we had to learn of utopia in
order to see the “proof of the project's failure”, writes Marin. We are, by now, more aware of the
university's social, as opposed to cultural, function than we would like. We are now beyond the age
of innocence when we could imagine an academy free from interdependence with the dominant
ideology, be that in its  mirroring of the “capitalist  industrial  system” or of the labour practices
“linked to the most insidious forms of cultural exploitation”, to cite Marin again (5).
[SLIDE]
In our field of study, fictions such as 2666 are not important so much for the specific topoi
they present, although these are undoubtedly of enormous significance, but rather for their more
generalizable  quality  as  the  process  of  dislocation  and reformulation.  This  notion  of  fiction  as
process can be, perhaps albeit unintentionally, seen in other works of twenty-first century fiction.
Consider  Haruki  Murakami's  1Q84  with  its  similar  abandonment  of  resolution.  This  is  a  very
different mode of indeterminate conclusion to Pynchon's novels, which frequently end on in the
apocalyptic sublime, or ironic nostalgia, or even to David Foster Wallace's The Broom of the System
and  Infinite  Jest,  wherein  the  refusal  to  close  the  temporal  loop is  itself  a  signifying  practice.
Murukami's novel has no such pretensions even to dialectical fictions such as China Mieville's King
Rat. Instead,  1Q84 presents a thrust at utopic dislocation through its twin-mooned world, but in
terms of narrative builds and builds until the repetition causes a realisation that resolution is too
late. It is utopian in the “no place” homophonic prefix through the too late; the time that remains is
too  little.  This  encoded,  again crypto-didactic,  metafictive practice  is  a  refinement  of  its  crude
precursor  in  Barth's  1960s  metafiction  and  points  to  the  pedagogical  mode;  rather  than
metafictionally  stating its  utopian nature,  the text  shows this,  which I  appreciate  sounds like a
creative writing class cliché, but is probably more akin to an inversion of Frank Ramsey's statement
on Wittgenstein: perhaps rather than outright saying it, the text structurally whistles it.
[SLIDE]
This makes sense as an extrapolation from Marin's formulation of literary utopia. Indeed, his
table of contents splits fiction into simulacrum and signification, a schema of codes and play that
correspond to enunciation  and the enunciated  expression thus  implying a  dialogic structure.  In
short, between practice and discourse, fiction sits as the “stage”, the utopian operation of process
(27). 2666 is a text that deliberately signals itself in this mode. Its city is not Ciudad Juárez [See-
you-dad  hwAR-eth]  but  an  emphatically  insisted-upon  intra-textual  reality:  “Santa  Teresa.  I'm
talking  about  Santa  Teresa”  (459).  Bolaño even signals  that  we should  read  2666  in  a  critical
dystopic mode through his mapping of the city space. Indeed, Bolaño reworks Marin's formulation
that  the  utopian  city  “gives  not  a  possible  route,  or  even  a  system  of  possible  routes,  but
articulations signaled by closed and open surface spaces” (208) in the fact that his city is mapped by
the female body, navigated by the male police officials, mediated through the intersubjective shifts
of narration in the novel. To evoke Borges, as does Marin, this is a one-to-one map of the necropolis
narrated with the body-as-text.
[SLIDE]
The  dystopia  of  2666  is  also  useful  to  focus  upon  the  failure  of  '68  in  its  critique  of
liberation theology (or perhaps of the failure of the mainstream Catholic church to integrate its
message),  a movement that Jay Winter deems important for this time in  Dreams of Peace and
Freedom. As a brief introduction: liberation theology is a strand of Christianity that interprets the
teachings of Christ in terms of freedom from injustice, be that social, economic or political. At the
lower level, Bolaño's text enacts a critique of a theocentric, as opposed to anthropocentric, model,
for amid the truly criminal femicide taking place at the outskirts of Santa Teresa, in the dumps of
the dispossessed, the police choose to divert much of their labour to solving the isolated case of a
church-defiler, the so-called Demon Penitent, who urinates in churches, albeit also stabbing a priest.
Furthermore, this diversion serves to bring focus to a waste of resources in attacking those who
attack the church,  when,  for Bolaño,  real  social  change will  not  come through any theological
component. This seeming rejection of post-secular thinking, from a major figure in the first decade
of twenty-first-century literature merits consideration, particularly at a time when notions of re-
enchantment are appearing in the debate with ever-growing frequency, but also in any consideration
of a utopic fictional practice on injustice, set in South America: the home of Gustavo Gutierrez and
liberation theology.
[SLIDE]
In a European context, a different brand of liberation theology is crucial to '68 though, as
Winter notes, because, through the radical self-sacrifice of Dietrich Bonhoeffer “in the early part of
the decade [the 1960s], the subject of the Nazi extermination of the Jews was beginning to escape
from the veil which had obscured it over the previous decade. This was now a subject of direct
moral and political relevance, and contributed much to the background of the 1968 revolt” (142).
Indeed, in thinking through the pedagogy of twenty-first-century utopianism, '68 is key. While there
were jokes: “Je suis Marxiste, tendance Groucho” (152), the core utopic thrust is better shown in
“sous le pavé, la plage” – “Under the paving stones, the beach”. 2666 is a novel that is sensitive to
this heritage. Charting a worldwide course, Archimboldi is revealed, in the final part, to have killed
a German bureaucrat, responsible for the deaths of his Jewish prisoners. While other fictions may
be more cynical – Thomas Pynchon presents a genealogy of racist property appropriation in the
creation of beaches in his 2009 novel, Inherent Vice, that takes “Under the paving stones, the beach”
as its epigraph – Bolaño's focus on globalization and utopia is clear.
Furthermore, 2666 is interesting for the temporality within which its critique is framed. Most
utopian  fictions  have  to  dislocate  their  spatial  and temporal  setting.  Here  Bolaño certainly  re-
spatializes  his  setting,  but  its  temporality  is  debatably  located  amid  a  fluctuation  of  the
contemporary and the future, when the novel's title is read through the reference in  Amulet  to“a
cemetery in the year 2666”. The interesting point here is that Bolaño's novel specifically avoids the
conservative  nostalgia  of  many  texts.  Again,  think  of  Pynchon's  wistful  forks  in  the  road that
America never took in  Gravity's Rainbow,  Mason & Dixon,  Against the Day,  or even  Inherent
Vice's elegy for the fog of the sixties. This fiction of process teaches  us that we do not need new
theories to understand its crypto-didactic message, but that we do need new theories to effectively
resist domination and injustice in the twenty-first-century, in a space where “the victims of sex
crimes in this city” number “[m]ore that two thousand a year. And almost half of them are underage.
And probably at least that many don't report being attacked. […] every day more than ten women
are raped here” (563).
[SLIDE]
What  I've  tried  to  suggest  here,  thinking through the  utopic  practice  of  2666  is  that  it
provides a valuable model for teaching the aesthetics of a didactic work, no matter how embedded
that didacticism might be. Indeed, I'm arguing, the more embedded the work of teaching is within
the novel itself, the more it becomes a fiction of process, a brand of metafiction that calls attention
to affect and mechanism; perhaps, dare I say it, a reflexive transformed subjectivity through reading
– a very late-Foucauldian ethics. As Bolaño's characters converse: “'That's a pretty story. […] A pity
I'm too old and have seen too much to believe it' 'It has nothing to do with belief […] it has to do
with understanding, and then changing'” (716). In this instance, the utopic future-orientation of this
novel can be used profitably to reconsider the neo-liberal co-option of the university and to attempt
to posit new forks in the road at our present juncture, rather than nostalgically lamenting already-
faded moments and cynically decrying new proposals for change. Those who think this may be
pushing a step too far in sociological readings of the academy beside literature should consider the
importance of the moment: current students have little knowledge of any system other than one in
which they buy education as a commodity. This neo-liberal paradigm is omnipresent and must be
resisted for it is becoming extremely difficult to think otherwise than the merely extant.
[SLIDE]
Finally, then, I'd like to suggest that an Adorno for texts provides us an anti-Adorno for
praxis; reading texts to reveal their political process to posit utopia once more may be a way out of
the  stasis  of  pure  theoria.  As  Catherine  Belsey  puts  it:  “[a]ssumptions  about  literature  involve
assumptions about language and about meaning, and these in turn involve assumptions about human
society. The independent universe of literature and autonomy of criticism are false”. Although this
doesn't get us out of Adorno's theoretical problem that, in the false world all praxis is false, Roberto
Bolaño espouses, in  2666, a newly naïve ethics that asks us to believe once more in the political,
utopian and didactic function of fiction. I'll leave you with one final quotation from  2666 that I
think sums up this retreat back to theory, to fiction abstaining from the creation of a just life but
didactically  howling through its  process  nonetheless:  “What  is  it  I  want  you to  do?  asked the
congresswoman. [SLIDE] I want you to write about this, keep writing about this. […] I want you to
strike hard, strike human flesh, unassailable flesh, not shadows” (631).
